The strengths of Lula, Putin, Modi, Xi, and Ramaphosa at the East Asian Summit — Phar Kim Beng

AUGUST 9 — When Kuala Lumpur hosts the East Asian Summit (EAS) this October 2025, it will be more than just another multilateral gathering. 

For the first time in its history, all five leaders of BRICS—Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping, and Cyril Ramaphosa—will be seated in the same plenary hall as US President Donald Trump. 

This is no ordinary convergence. These are leaders who, in one way or another, have felt the sting of Trump’s tariffs, tirades, and transactional diplomacy. 

Yet, rather than retreat into silence, BRICS has responded with the idea of de-dollarization—a direct challenge to Washington’s long-standing prerogative to define the rules of global trade and finance.

This moment is pregnant with strategic possibilities. BRICS does not merely want a “multipolar world” in the academic sense; it seeks to dismantle the uni-multipolar order where the United States retains disproportionate primacy, riding roughshod over allies and adversaries alike. 

Their counter-narrative is rooted in the belief that global power must be dispersed, not hoarded, and that the rules of engagement—whether in trade, diplomacy, or security—should be negotiated, not dictated.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s own grand strategy, based on building what he calls a Dialogical Community, dovetails neatly with the aspirations of BRICS. 

While some in the West may dismiss the term as rhetorical flourish, its substance becomes clear when set against the backdrop of the past year. 

The world has wobbled over principles once considered sacrosanct: diplomacy, territorial integrity, the rule of law, most-favoured-nation treatment, reciprocity, and tariff stability. 

In each of these domains, Washington—under Trump—has taken an unorthodox approach, often punitive toward “friends and foes alike, especially friends.”

In such a context, Anwar’s insistence on dialogue, reciprocity, and inclusive diplomacy does not appear naïve. Instead, it is a necessary corrective to a global order adrift. 

His role as Asean Chair in 2025, coupled with Malaysia’s hosting of both the Asean–GCC Summit and the Asean–China Economic Summit earlier this year, positions Kuala Lumpur as a venue where world leaders can engage without the suffocating preconditions of bloc politics.

For all the leaders of BRICS, this will be the first direct encounter with Trump since his return to the White House. The tensions are palpable. 

Trump has publicly threatened additional tariffs on any nation flirting with de-dollarization, yet the quiet accumulation of gold reserves by BRICS states—and recently by France and Germany—signals that the shift is already underway.

Here, Europe’s role is nuanced. France and Germany, though not Strategic Dialogue Partners of the EAS, are represented by the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen. 

She has floated the idea of an EU–RCEP–CPTPP alignment to counter Trump’s tariff regime, but execution has lagged behind rhetoric. Still, her presence ensures Europe will not be sidelined in KL.

Trump’s presence at the EAS is significant in three ways. First, it marks his return to a forum he last attended in 2017 under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. 

Second, it gives him a platform to engage directly with a bloc where most tariff disputes with the US have already been partially resolved—potentially allowing him to pivot toward new deals. 

Third, it places him in the same room as leaders whose economies are increasingly intertwined through South–South trade.

Indeed, trade between Brazil, India, Indonesia, and China has grown by over 12–15 percent in recent years, underscoring the rise of alternative economic linkages that dilute US leverage. 

For Trump, the optics will be clear: America’s post–World War II share of global GDP has shrunk from 46 percent to just 26 percent. 

The room he walks into in Kuala Lumpur is a different world from the one Washington dominated in the mid-20th century.

Anwar’s ability to host this gathering is not merely a product of his premiership. 

Long before becoming Prime Minister, he cultivated relationships with Lula and Ramaphosa as a prominent opposition leader, intellectual, and advocate for the Global South. 

These personal connections—rooted in shared values of social justice, anti-apartheid solidarity, and equitable development—now serve as diplomatic capital.

It is this long arc of relationship-building that allows Anwar to position Malaysia as a bridge between the Global North and Global South, between the G7 and BRICS, between the US and China. 

The fact that Malaysia has also taken up the anti-genocide cause with vigour further strengthens its moral authority. 

And contrary to some assumptions, this is not necessarily a problem for Trump. 

The US President has himself publicly acknowledged that Gaza is facing serious starvation—a statement that opens the door for rare humanitarian convergence. 

Anwar, who frames his foreign policy in terms of human dignity and the sanctity of life, can use this to invite Trump into a joint effort on Gaza relief, showing that even adversaries on trade can be partners in humanity.

What makes this scenario more plausible is that Anwar has already established a surprisingly warm rapport with Trump. 

Their first substantive phone call after Trump’s return to the White House was marked by unexpected cordiality. 

Anwar, recognizing Trump’s mercantilist instincts, did not attempt to lecture him on norms or moral imperatives. 

Instead, he couched Malaysia’s proposals in the language of mutual benefit, a lexicon Trump understands and respects.

The discussion reportedly touched on rolling back certain tariffs, ensuring semiconductor supply chain resilience, and Malaysia’s potential role in mediating sensitive Middle Eastern issues where Trump still has personal channels. 

The Gaza humanitarian crisis was not avoided—it was addressed in pragmatic terms, with both leaders agreeing on the urgency of food and medical relief.

Observers noted that the call lasted over half an hour—longer than Trump often grants to leaders with whom he has no immediate transactional gain. Anwar’s deftness lay in presenting Malaysia not as a petitioner but as a strategic partner. 

By positioning himself as a leader who could help Trump achieve tangible outcomes—whether in trade, security, or humanitarian optics—he avoided the pitfalls that have tripped up others.

There is, of course, the likelihood that BRICS leaders will use the EAS stage to make sharp, even stinging remarks about US unilateralism. The global media will be watching for signs of coordinated pushback. 

But seasoned statesmen like Lula, Putin, Modi, Xi, and Ramaphosa understand the dangers of escalation. A frontal rhetorical assault on Trump could invite further tariffs and sanctions.

Anwar’s role will be to create a diplomatic environment where grievances can be aired without crossing into irretrievable hostility. 

His history with BRICS leaders, and his measured relationship with Trump, put him in a position to choreograph a kind of “strategic signalling”—asserting independence without closing the door to engagement. Informal pull-aside meetings in Kuala Lumpur may matter as much as the formal plenary.

If Anwar can shepherd these interactions toward constructive dialogue, the October EAS could be remembered as the moment multipolarity moved from theory to practice. 

The summit may not resolve all disputes, but bringing all the key players to the same table—and framing the conversation around shared interests rather than irreconcilable differences—could leave a legacy beyond his term in office.

In a world where power is fragmenting and alliances are fluid, the ability to convene is itself a form of power. 

In October 2025, Malaysia will wield it—not merely as host, but as conductor of a complex diplomatic orchestra. And in that music, there may yet be space for the rare harmony of a Trump—no matter how minute a chance—who recognises both the realities of multipolarity and the urgency of feeding the starving in Gaza now. Not October 2025.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and director at the Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.