JULY 29 — At first glance, the simmering conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border appears manageable. It is a border dispute between two Asean member states with a shared history, rich cultural heritage, and long-standing diplomatic ties.
Yet, paradoxically, it has become one of the most explosive challenges Asean has faced since the historic Bali Summit in 1976. What should be the lowest hanging fruit of peace-making has morphed into a geopolitical conundrum, threatening the very principle that underpins Asean unity: peaceful resolution of disputes.
All ten member states of Asean, alongside Strategic Dialogue Partners such as the United States and China, are unequivocal in their desire to see peace restored in the region.
From Laos, the former Chair of Asean, to Malaysia, the current Chair, and the Philippines, the incoming Chair in 2026, there is no dissent. The consensus is clear: peace must prevail in Indo-China.
All ten member states of Asean, alongside Strategic Dialogue Partners such as the United States and China, are unequivocal in their desire to see peace restored in the region. — Reuters pic
Unlike the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen—where the lines of contestation are deeply entangled with ideological schisms, proxy rivalries, and regional realignments—the Thai-Cambodian conflict is, on paper, one of the easiest to resolve. The lives of over 80,000 people, uprooted and traumatized across both sides of the border, could be spared further agony if only both sides would agree to an unconditional ceasefire, regardless of who fired first.
Indeed, on July 26, the second day of the conflict, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, in his capacity as Asean Chair, issued a forthright call for both Thailand and Cambodia to “cease and desist” from further armed confrontation. Remarkably, the guns did fall silent—for a brief hour—before being replaced by a renewed barrage of shelling. That fleeting pause highlights the tragedy of this conflict: the possibility of peace is within reach, yet the political and military calculus on both sides appears to be steering in the opposite direction.
What makes this episode so confounding is the apparent disregard for Asean’s foundational principles, especially the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which explicitly enshrines that “force shall not be an instrument of foreign policy.”
Thailand, as a founding member of Asean, and Cambodia, a member since 1999 after a harrowing civil war, are both bound by these norms. Their repeated skirmishes—most notably in 2008 and 2011 over the ancient temple of Preah Vihear—ought to have served as cautionary tales. Instead, the current escalation suggests a regression from the diplomatic maturity Asean prides itself on.
The situation becomes even more perplexing with reports that Thailand’s navy—stationed some 750 kilometers away from the 817-kilometre border—is being mobilized in the Gulf of Thailand.
What strategic rationale underpins this naval involvement in a land-based conflict? It raises more questions than answers.
At the core of this conflict may lie something deceptively mundane: maps.
Cambodia maintains that the proper reference should be colonial-era maps at a scale of 1:200,000—maps once accepted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962 when it awarded Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia, though it remained silent on adjacent territories. Thailand, especially its military, insists on a more granular scale of 1:50,000, arguing for higher precision. In this cartographic divergence lies a gaping chasm, one that fuels military posturing and nationalist fervor.
Despite these technical disputes, there is no reason this conflict should escalate into a prolonged confrontation. Anwar Ibrahim’s diplomatic efforts—backed by the U.S., China, and the European Union—are not just timely but imperative.
That China, despite its complex history with Cambodia, has agreed to observe rather than interfere, is a significant endorsement of Asean’s centrality. Equally critical is the support of the Philippines and Singapore, the next two Chairs of Asean, who must now prepare to uphold and sustain any ceasefire framework or de-escalation architecture built in Kuala Lumpur.
The stakes are high. If this conflict drags on, by the time Thailand assumes the Asean Chair in 2028, there may be no impartial third-party mediator left within Asean to arbitrate. A Chair embroiled in an active territorial dispute will compromise the credibility of Asean’s conflict-resolution mechanisms and the very notion of Asean centrality itself.
Yet, there are encouraging signs. The current alignment of international support around Malaysia’s chairmanship has revived the concept of an Asean Troika—where the previous, current, and incoming chairs work together to manage crises. This tripartite mechanism, often dormant in Asean diplomacy, is now being deployed effectively, with Kuala Lumpur at the helm.
That this initiative has the consent of Washington and Beijing, not to mention Brussels, demonstrates rare multilateral consensus in a region often caught in the crosshairs of great power rivalry.
However, prudence is necessary. While Thailand’s military may have the right to respond to incursions or casualties, it must now prioritize international mediation, disarmament, and transparency.
Cambodia, led by Senate President Hun Sen and Prime Minister Hun Manet, must also accept that war is a luxury Phnom Penh can ill afford.
With its forces outmanned and outgunned, prolonging the conflict would be strategically suicidal and economically ruinous.
The upcoming Kuala Lumpur Summit between Thai and Cambodian leaders is thus critical. Not only must it forge an immediate ceasefire, but it must also establish a timeline for demilitarization and third-party verification.
Both sides must rein in their respective militaries, whose operational independence risks dragging both nations into a conflict neither wants nor can sustain. The unresolved legacies of colonial cartography and nationalist pride must not be allowed to eclipse the hard-won stability Asean has nurtured since 1967.
If managed well, this could be Asean’s finest hour. If not, it could mark the beginning of its irrelevance.
Peace is indeed the lowest hanging fruit in this crisis, but as history has shown time and again, it is often the most difficult one to pluck.
*This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
